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Abstract
This paper studies the link between trade reforms and labor informality in Argentina using
a long time series spanning the 1980-2001 period. We explore cross-section mechanisms, that
operate at the industry level, and time-series mechanisms, that operate at a general equilibrium
level. We argue that firms can substitute formal with informal workers to smooth a negative
trade shock. In this setting, industries exposed to larger tariffs cuts could experience increases in
informality. In general equilibrium, there can be additional aggregate impacts in both manufac-
turing and non-traded sectors through workers reallocation between sectors, wage adjustments,
and firm entry and exit. Using the cross-section variation of the data and an instrumental
variable strategy we explore empirically the cross-section mechanisms. We find that reductions
in industry tariffs increase labor informality, and the effect is differentially stronger in indus-
tries with a larger share of small size firms. Using the time-series variation of the data, we are
able to identify some of the general equilibrium effects. We find that the fall in the average
national tariff decreased aggregate informality in the manufacturing sector but increased it in
the non-traded sector.
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1 Introduction
Economic theory indicates that trade liberalization should lead to a reallocation of factors from
protected to comparative advantage sectors, but the empirical evidence for developing countries
often unveils more complex dynamic responses (Wacziarg and Wallack, 2004; Menezes-Filho and
Muendler, 2011; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2015). In the literature, this is typically explained by
limited factor mobility caused by reallocation costs (Atolia, 2007; Artuc et al., 2010; Dix-Carneiro,
2014). In this paper, we focus instead on labor informality as an additional trade adjustment
mechanism. Informality is a relevant margin of adjustment for labor demand and labor supply in
developing countries and this margin of adjustment can be affected by trade reforms (Currie and
Harrison, 1997; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Levy, 2008; Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2011; Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak, 2015). We build on this literature to explore how trade reforms affect labor
informality and to identify various partial and general equilibrium mechanisms. Following Galiani
and Porto (2010), we exploit a long time series of trade reforms and informality for Argentina.
In the trade literature, firms respond to tariffs cuts by reducing wages and by firing workers
who reallocate to comparative advantage sectors. In turn, if informal workers are “cheaper” than
formal workers, because of various taxes associated with formality, firms can increase the fraction
of informal workers as an adjustment mechanism. Thus, increasing tax evasion could be a strategy
to smooth the negative trade shock. In this setting, industries exposed to larger tariff cuts could
experience increases in informality. In general equilibrium, there can be additional aggregate im-
pacts in both manufacturing and non-traded sectors. These additional impacts are explained by the
usual trade adjustment mechanisms of workers reallocation between sectors, wage adjustments, and
firm entry and exit. For instance, as workers reallocate out of an industry, they can get absorbed
into the non-traded sector. To the extent that these workers are employed informally, tariff cuts
can be associated with higher informality in the non-traded sector. However, if, for tax evasion
reasons, exposed industries fire formal workers in higher proportion relative to informal workers,
formal wages may decline with respect to informal wages. Formal workers may become cheaper
and informality may decline, both in manufactures and in non-traded sectors. Further, the loss of
tariff protection can induce firms to exit the market. As more efficient firms stay, provided they
are likely to be more formal than smaller exiting firms, informality can decline as well through this
channel. In the literature, it has been often difficult to disentangle these different mechanisms.
In this paper, we study these mechanisms in Argentina using a long time series of tariffs and
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individual workers spanning the 1980-2001 period (Galiani and Porto, 2010). During this period,
Argentina experienced a sizeable increase in overall labor informality and important trade policy
changes, leading to substantial time-series and inter-industry variation in tariffs for the manufac-
turing sector. Using the cross-section variation in the data, we explore the partial equilibrium
mechanisms. We find that trade liberalization, measured as cross-industry reductions in tariffs,
raised labor informality at the industry level. Additionally, the magnitude of this effect depends
on the size of the firms in each industry. When small firms prevail, we find evidence that firms
substitute informal workers for formal workers, but this effect fades away as average firm size within
industries increases. This can be explained by less efficient tax evasion controls for smaller firms.
Using the time-series variation of the data, we are able to identify some of the general equilib-
rium effects of trade reforms. We find that, conditional on the structure of sectoral protection, the
fall in the average national tariff decreased aggregate informality in the manufacturing sector but
increased it in the non-traded sector. This result can be rationalized with an outflow of workers
from manufacturing, a resulting wage adjustment that makes formality cheaper, and the exit of
small firms because of foreign competition. In the non-traded sector, the evidence suggests that
the inflow of displaced manufacturing workers finds mostly informal jobs.
These results can help explain some of the conflicting evidence previously documented in the
literature. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), Bosch et al. (2012),
and Paz (2014) find no or only limited evidence of a significant impact of import tariff reductions
on informality in Brazil and Colombia. By contrast, Acosta and Montes-Rojas (2014) report an
increase in labor informality in Argentina and Arias et al. (2013) and Dix-Carneiro and Kovak
(2015) a similar effect following liberalization for Brazil and Mexico in the first case, and only
for Brazil in the second case. Alema´n-Castilla (2006), on the other hand, predicts a decrease in
informality in Mexico. We argue that these heterogeneous results could be confounded by the
different time spans of these studies, and by the different mechanisms uncovered by our analysis.
In fact, while the literature on trade and informality emphasizes different mechanisms to inter-
pret the different empirical results, there is no study recognizing and estimating partial equilibrium
mechanisms as a deviation from general equilibrium trends. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) focus on
labor costs reductions due to increased foreign competition. Alema´n-Castilla (2006) maintains that
the reallocation of market shares and profits from the least productive to the most productive firms
impacts negatively on the employment share of the informal sector. Similarly, Paz (2014) expects
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a reallocation of market shares between firms producing domestically and firms that export, which
may impact on the share of informal workers. Bosch et al. (2012) and Acosta and Montes-Rojas
(2014) investigate the greater access to imported capital goods that may increase productivity as
a mechanism affecting the share of informal workers. Arias et al. (2013) highlight the increase in
the opportunity cost of inactive individuals who could enter the labor force in informal or formal
jobs depending on the entry costs. Finally, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) focus on the imperfect
and slow factor adjustment associated to a trade liberalization episode. In their model, workers
from the regions with larger tariff reductions spend less time in formal employment and transition
mainly into the non-tradable sector, while workers from the non-tradable sector move slowly into
informal employment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the relationship
between trade reforms and labor informality in Argentina through simple correlations, and we iden-
tify some of the mechanisms through which this relationship may operate. Section 3 presents our
empirical strategy and the regression analysis to identify the effect of trade reforms on informality
levels. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Trade Reforms and Informality: Adjustment Mechanisms
In this section, we introduce the relationship between trade reforms and labor informality in Ar-
gentina and we identify some of the plausible mechanisms through which this relationship operates.
This discussion illustrates the basic correlations that we study in detail in the econometric section
below and it is intended to motivate the analysis. This first look at the data is based on a combina-
tion of tariff protection data with information from repeated cross sections of labor market surveys.
We use the import tariffs data at the 3-digit ISIC classification (a total of 24 manufacturing sectors)
compiled by Galiani and Porto (2010). The information about labor market outcomes comes from
the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), a periodical household and labor force survey with
detailed information on labor market outcomes and individual and household characteristics. The
overlap between the tariff data of Galiani and Porto (2010) and the labor market data from the
EPH allows us to work with a long time series spanning the 1980-2001 period.
Table 1 reports yearly sample sizes (wage employees in the manufacturing sector) from EPH
surveys, the average tariff and its standard deviation, and the average labor informality rate for
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manufactures, the non-tradable sector and the aggregate economy.1 We adopt the social protection-
tax evasion definition of informality, which refers to the nature of the labor relationship between
employer and employee rather than to characteristics of the worker or the firm (for instance, pro-
ductivity). We classify a worker as informal if the firm does not pay the statutory payroll taxes
and social insurance contributions based on his or her salary, which implies that the worker is not
registered with the tax and social insurance administrations (we refer interchangeably to infor-
mal or unregistered workers). This implies that the worker does not receive the bundle of social
insurance benefits financed by the State—basically, health insurance and the right to a contribu-
tory old age employment-linked pension. This does not necessarily imply that labor informality
is solely a unilateral decision of the worker or the firm. It can be an outcome from a bargaining
process on employment characteristics, with associated costs (taxes and contributions for the firm,
which potentially translate into lower wages for workers) and benefits (the social insurance package)
(Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2011). There is a margin of adjustment because workers can have
heterogeneous preferences in their valuation of these benefits, and firms can also face different costs
associated, for instance, to their size through the enforcement of these labor market regulations
(Kleven et al., 2009). The labor informality rate at the industry or aggregate level is simply the
proportion of employees working in these conditions.
The simple descriptive statistics in Table 1 uncover the basic correlation that we study in
this paper: while the average tariff fell 35 percent between 1980 and 2001, the average level of
informality increased by 93 percent over the same period. We further explore this correlation in
Figure 1. During this period, there are two very noticeable episodes of tariff cuts. Protection was
highest in 1980, with an average tariff of around 40 percent (with protection in some industries
reaching 55 percent). The average tariff was cut by 10 percentage points between 1985 and 1989
and, in fact, the entire distribution of industry tariffs moved downward (the 75th percentile was,
in general, below the 25th percentile of the first two years).2 After 1990, Argentina implemented a
broad program of trade liberalization that included unilateral tariff reductions and the adoption of
Mercosur, a regional trade agreement with neighboring countries Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in
1991. During this period, the mean tariff fell 10 additional percentage points, while tariff dispersion
1We do not include public sector, agricultural and mining workers in our calculations since the EPH is an urban
survey without any coverage of rural areas.
2As noted by Galiani and Porto (2010), this decade was also characterized by the use of non-tariff barriers,
which we do not capture. Non-tariff barriers were, however, fully eliminated by the year 1988. We investigate the
implications of this below. In 1989, there was also an increase in tariffs due to a hyperinflation crisis.
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also declined.
The informality rate in manufactures, by contrast, exhibited an upward trend over time, more
than doubling between 1980 and 2001. The greatest increase occurred in the 1980s, and it grew
at a slower pace during the 1990s. The informality rate temporarily dropped from 1991 to 1994, a
period of stabilization and growth following the hyperinflation episode of 1989-1991. In 1994, the
most significant year in terms of labor and other market-oriented structural reforms in the economy,
the informality rate returned to its increasing trend reaching peaks of 31 percent (in 1996) and 35
percent (in 1999). Within manufactures, informality was higher in small industries relative to large
industries, with both showing increasing trends.3 Finally, note that the informality rate in the
non-traded sector was higher than in the manufacturing sector, with a similar increasing trend over
the period.
In the trade literature, firms typically respond to tariff cuts by reducing wages and by firing
workers. An additional adjustment mechanism that we highlight in this paper is that firms may
find it optimal to change the composition of their employment structure, with less formal jobs and
more informal jobs. They can do so by firing “expensive” formal workers (because of payroll
taxes and social insurance contributions) and hiring other workers informally, or by colluding
with their existing employees and re-negotiating existing employment relationships from formal
to informal (Bergolo and Cruces, 2014). Thus, increasing tax evasion in the form of unregistered
or informal employment becomes a strategy for firms (and perhaps for workers, if the alternative
is unemployment) to smooth the negative trade shock.
A fundamental premise of our analysis is that the correlation between tariffs and labor informal-
ity in the manufacturing sector combines partial and general equilibrium mechanisms. In partial
equilibrium, when labor cannot reallocate across sectors, we should expect effects at the industry
level. These effects are thus more easily pictured by comparing the cross-sectional relationship
between changes in tariffs and changes in labor informality across industries. This relationship is
plotted in Figure 2. For all industries (panel A), this correlation is negative, so that industries
exposed to larger tariff cuts experienced an increase in their labor informality rate. Furthermore,
the correlation is much stronger among small size industries (panel B) than among larger indus-
3We use information from the EPH about the size of the firm where each worker is employed. This information is
categorical in the survey, the categories being 1=1 employee, 2=2 to 5, 3=5 to 15; 4=16 to 25; 5=26 to 50; 6=51 to
100; 7=101 to 500; 8=501 or more. We classify a firm as small when the size is 15 workers or less. We then define
an industry as small when the share of workers employed in small firms is 0.5 or larger. In our econometric analysis
we perform robustness tests on this size threshold.
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tries (panel C), where it actually vanishes. This indicates that the use of labor informality as an
adjustment mechanism may differ according to the size of firms in each industry. The tax-evasion
literature suggests that the detection technology used by the tax authority is a plausible explanation
for these patterns.
To explore general equilibrium effects, we can look at conditional trends (Galiani and Porto,
2010). To do this, we estimate a model using cross-section data where the dependent variable
is the labor informality status of manufacturing workers, and the independent variables are their
individual characteristics, industry tariffs, and industry and year indicators. These year dummies
capture the level of informality at different periods of time, conditional on the other included
covariates. In Figure 3, we plot this conditional or residual informality rate on the average national
tariff. In panel A, the correlation is positive, indicating that a reduction in labor informality over
time occurred concurrently with the fall of the average national tariff once the effect of cross-industry
tariff differences was accounted for.
In general equilibrium, informality in the non-traded sector can also be affected by trade policy.
To show this, we estimate the conditional or residual informality rate for the non-traded sector,
and we plot, in panel B of Figure 3, the correlation with the average tariff. In this case, labor
informality in the non-traded sector is negatively correlated with the average national tariff rate.
3 Regression Analysis
In this section, we set up a formal regression analysis to explore the correlations established above.
Our aims are to identify the causal impact of trade liberalization on informality and to disentangle
the different mechanisms at work. We estimate the two-step empirical model of Galiani and Porto
(2010) with an instrumental variables estimator. We first exploit the cross-sectional variation in
tariffs and labor informality to estimate the partial equilibrium mechanisms or within industry
effects. We then rely on our time-series of cross-section data to estimate general equilibrium effects
for the aggregate manufacturing and non-traded sectors.
3.1 Cross-Sectional Mechanisms
We begin with the cross-sectional analysis. Our empirical model is:
(1) yijt = x
0
ijtβx + βτ ln τjt + Ij + Tt + εijt,
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where yijt is the informality status of individual i employed in industry j at time t, τjt is the
tariff on industry j at time t, and the vector x includes individual characteristics, such as gender,
age, marital status, indicator variables for head of household and education, as well as household
characteristics such as the number of children and household income (in equivalent-adult units).
The baseline model also includes industry Ij and time Tt fixed effects.
Following the tax evasion literature discussed above, we expect the effect of trade policy changes
to be different depending on firm size in each industry. Large firms are more visible and face a
greater probability of detection. As a result, the labor force of a large firm will be mostly (or fully)
formal. The opposite happens in small-size firms which face a lower probability of detection and
thus may evade social insurance contributions to a greater extent. We work with two measures of
industry size that arguably capture the tax evasion mechanism that we advocate. For definition
1, we use EPH data and calculate the shares of workers employed in small-size firms (firms with
15 workers or less) in each industry in 1980. The intuition is that industries where small firms
are more prevalent than large firms will be less likely to be detected by the tax authorities. For
definition 2, we define indicator variables of industry size based on those shares. Concretely, an
industry is defined as small when the share of workers in small firms is greater than the share of
workers in large firms in 1980. According to this industry size definition, 12 out of the 24 industries
were classified as small.4 We expand model (1) as follows:
(2) yijt = x
0
ijtβx + βτ ln τjt + βsτSj ln τjt + βsSj + Ij + Tt + εijt,
where Sj is the industry size variable, either the share of workers employed in small-size firms in
industry j (definition 1) or a small-industry dummy (definition 2), and Sj ln τjt is an interaction
term with the industry tariff. The coefficient of the interaction term, βsτ , is the part of the impact
of trade on informal employment that depends on the initial share of small-size firms in the industry
(definition 1) or the differential impact of trade on informal employment in initially small industries,
relative to large industries (definition 2). We expect this interaction term to be negative.
This specification allows us to account for several confounding factors for the impacts of trade
policy, βτ and βsτ . Industry and time fixed effects control for industry-specific characteristics and
aggregate shocks related to business cycles and other policy changes. For instance, if the government
4Appendix C presents results based on alternative cut-offs to define small and large size firms. Our results are
robust to these alternative definitions.
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raises tariffs during a recession and workers move from formality to informality, βτ and βsτ could
be biased upward because of the business cycle effect. Time fixed effects also allow us to control
for political economy changes related to the labor market, such as variations in tax regimes and in
social insurance contributions, regulations regarding type of labor contracts, and so on. Similarly,
unobserved industry characteristics that are time invariant, such as the ability to form a lobby,
industry productivity or capital intensity, could affect industry tariffs and informal employment
simultaneously. The inclusion of industry fixed effects controls for these unobserved factors that
could be correlated with tariffs and have an independent effect on informal employment.
In addition, our data spans a long time series of active trade policy. A before-after comparison of
a single episode of trade liberalization would be missing out the important fact that the comparison
is between an initial pattern of trade protection and another one with lower protection, but not
between autarky and free trade (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). As in Galiani and Porto (2010),
our time series of cross-sections overcomes this limitation by allowing for the comparison of trends
in trade reforms and those in the outcome variable of interest, labor informality.
Even in our setting, where we compare within industry changes along varying trends of trade
liberalization, there might still remain certain omitted factors that can lead to biases. For instance,
industry unionization and lobbying power can achieve lower tariff cuts and more rapid declines in
informality. Alternatively, gains in productivity at the industry level may correlate with higher tariff
cuts (because of lower costs of imported capital goods) as well as with larger declines in informality.5
In order to supplement our OLS results, we also explore instrumental variable models. We work
with two instruments often used in the literature: the initial industry tariff and an industry weighted
average of Argentina’s trade partners exchange rates. More concretely, we interact industry tariffs
in the first period (1980) with a three-category variable that captures three stages of Argentine
trade policy, namely the initial period with high tariffs (years 1980 to 1985), the flat-tariff period
of 1986 to 1989, and the last decade, from 1990 to 2001. A similar approach was proposed by
Topalova (2010). The instrument z1 is defined as:
z1jt = ln τj,1980 ∗ Postt,(3)
where τj,1980 is the initial sectoral tariff and Postt is an indicator variable. The plausible validity
5Acosta and Montes-Rojas (2014) report a lower impact of tariffs reduction on labor informality in industries that
invest more during the 1992-2003 period in Argentina.
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of this instrument is illustrated in Figure 4. The top panel shows that import tariffs fell in all
industries, while the bottom panel shows a differential pattern of tariff reduction across industries.
Industries that traditionally received the highest level of protection experienced the most drastic
reductions, while industries with the lowest tariff levels in 1980 faced the lowest reductions.
The second instrument z2, the average exchange rate of main trading partners (Park et al.,
2010; Brambilla et al., 2012), is defined as:
z2jt =
X
c
ect ∗ θcj,1980,(4)
where ect is the exchange rate of country c (relative to the Argentine peso) at time t and θ
c
j,1980 is the
share of country c in Argentine imports of product j in 1980. Given this share, a higher exchange
rate of country c will generate higher imports from this country.6 Tariffs may increase to protect
industry j, or may fall to secure the gains from trade. This instrumental variable is thus based
on the variation in the exchange rates of all trading partners—a change arguably exogenous to the
model— and on each industry’s exposure to those changes, given their initial share on Argentine
imports of product j. By fixing the shares θcj,1980 at the 1980 level, we seek to predetermine
this value for all t, ensuring that tariff changes generated through exchange rates variations are
exogenous.
Cross-section results are reported in Table 2 for the model that interacts industry tariffs with
the share of small-size firms in each industry in 1980 (definition 1), and Table 3 for the model
that interacts industry tariffs with an indicator variable of small-size industry in 1980 (definition
2). In both tables, ordinary least squares (OLS) results are presented in panel A and instrumental
variables (IV) results, in panel B. First-stage results of the IV models are reported in panel C. In
all models, standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level.
In column 1, we estimate the model in (1), without interactions with industry size variables.
The effect of the sectoral tariffs on labor informality at the industry level (within-industry effect) is
indistinguishable from zero because potentially different industry responses cancel out, on average.
In column 2, we allow for heterogeneous effects. In Table 2, we find a positive OLS effect of tariffs
on informality but a negative interaction with industry size, as expected. In particular, as the
6Since we need to build the instrument for the whole 1980-2001 period, and because of data limitations, we focus
on Argentina’s major trade partners, namely Brazil, Chile, the United States and the European Union. Imports
value data come from UN Comtrade, and exchange rates data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI).
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share of small-size firms increases, the effect turns negative, indicating a within-industry increase
in the informality rate when tariffs fall. As additional robustness tests, we include in column 3 the
average industry wage as a control variable. Our estimated impacts are not affected significantly.
This is consistent with the wage adjustment associated with an episode of trade liberalization being
a general equilibrium mechanism that cannot be captured using the cross-sectional variation of the
data. Finally, to account for other potential confounding factors that might be driving the results,
we include initial industry characteristics, namely the share of skilled workers and the size of the
labor force in 1980, interacted with the variable Postt (which captures the trade policy stages).
The results in column 4 indicate that tariff reductions still lead to increases in labor informality
in industries with an initially large share of small-size firms. The magnitude of the effects is (in
absolute value) larger than before, indicating that confounding factors, if any, were weakening the
estimated impacts.
For further robustness analysis of our estimates, we discuss next the IV results. In panel C
of Table 2, we evaluate the first-stage results. The instruments behave relatively well in terms of
statistical significance, specially when we include an interaction term with a industry size variables.
However, using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald test and the Stock-Yogo critical values, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the instruments are weak.7 Despite this result, the Anderson-Rubin test does
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are irrelevant in the second-stage (when omitting
tariffs). Consequently, while the IV results can still show some biases, we believe they are still
useful in better establishing a link between tariffs and informality. Turning back to the second-
stage regressions in panel B, we confirm the results in columns 1-4. If anything, the IV results
appear stronger in magnitude.
The lack of an effect in large industries or the reduction in the informality rate reported in
Table 2 can be explained by tax evasion arguments: large firms face a high probability of detection
and do not resort to labor informality as an adjustment mechanism. An additional explanation can
be found in heterogeneous firms models of trade. Exporting firms are larger and more productive
than domestically-oriented firms (Bernard and Jensen, 1995). Thus, large industries are expected
to have a larger participation of exporting firms. With trade liberalization these firms can gain
access to new markets and expand, reducing the participation of informal labor. This behavior may
7Note that while the Stock-Yogo critical values are not valid under clustered standard errors, it is still customary
to use them with the Kleibergen-Paap tests. Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013) introduce a test that is valid for
non-iid errors, but which is only applicable with one endogenous regressor.
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neutralize any increase in informal employment by large firms producing for the domestic market.
Bustos (2011) provides evidence on the expansion of the exporting segment in Argentine industries
during 1992–1996 in the context of a regional trade liberalization episode (Mercosur).
For completeness, we end this section with a brief discussion of the model that interacts industry
tariffs with an indicator variable of small-size industry. These are results are reported in Table 3.
As it can be seen, the estimates in column 1 to 4 behave as before, qualitatively. This provides
additional support to the overall evaluation of the cross-section results.
3.2 General Equilibrium Mechanisms
We now use the time series variability in the data to look at general equilibrium effects—via labor
reallocation and wage adjustment as well as via firm entry and exit—that cannot be captured
with cross-sectional data. In particular, we investigate the aggregate effect of tariffs on both
manufacturing and non-tradable sectors. We study these effects with the strategy proposed by
Galiani and Porto (2010).8 We recover the time fixed effects estimated in model (2) and use
those as measures of the residual informality rate at time t once all the cross-section covariates are
accounted for, i.e., the part of the time-trend that is not correlated with individual characteristics
and specially with industry tariffs. Then, in a second step, we regress the residual informality rate
on the average national tariff of the economy weighted by the participation of each industry in total
employment:
(5) Tˆt =m
0
tαm + ατ ln τt + νt,
where m is a vector of controls. Because the dependent variable in this second stage is estimated,
we use weighted least squares with weights given by the inverse of the estimates of the variance of
the time fixed effects from the first stage.
Results are provided in Table 4 (using alternatively industry size definition 1 and industry size
definition 2 in the first step of the procedure (model (2))). The controls included inm in (5) are the
ratio of the labor force in tradable to non-tradable sectors, the average educational level of the labor
8The general idea is that the level of protection of a country (i.e., the average national tariff) has general equilibrium
impacts on informality. However, the economy is not fully flexible in the short-run, so that while there is an underlying
trend in informality that depends on the trend in average protection, there are short-run departures from this trend
(e.g., the within industry results of previous sections). Conceptually, the idea of Galiani and Porto (2010) is to control
for those short-run departures of the trend to extract the general equilibrium effect of tariffs.
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force and the proportion of small firms in each sector. Columns 1 and 2 show the OLS coefficients.
The average tariff is positively associated to the labor informality trend in the manufacturing
sector. In columns 3 and 4, we report the IV estimates, where the instrument is the average of
the exchange rate of major trade partners in each period, weighted by the participation of each
industry in total employment.9 The first stage results show that this instrument is statistically
significant. IV estimates from the second stage show that the average tariff impacts positively
on the labor informality trend of the manufacturing sector (i.e., a reduction in tariffs reduces
labor informality), after controlling for the structure of sectoral protection and allowing for general
equilibrium adjustments. Our estimates range between 0.06 and 0.15, indicating a reduction in the
labor informality rate of 0.6 to 1.5 percentage point for each 10% reduction in the national average
tariff.
We can interpret these results as follow. In the cross-section, inter-industry differences in tariff
cuts increase labor informality being the effect differentially stronger in industries with a larger
share of small-size firms. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the loss of profitability of
manufacturing firms induces them to decrease their formal-informal employment combination so
that informality increases. Given this structure of sectoral protection, however, aggregate labor
informality in manufactures declines with the fall in the national average tariff. This is because of
two reasons. First, the outflow of workers and the resulting wage adjustment can make formality
cheaper. Second, foreign competition can lead to firm exit and these are low productivity firms
which employ more informal workers.10 In terms of Figure 1, the trend in labor informality in the
manufacturing sector would have been steeper in the absence of trade liberalization.
With a similar reasoning, the non-traded sector may also be affected by the changes in average
protection in manufactures. To explore this, we run the first step regressions in Galiani and Porto
(2010) using workers in the non-traded sector (thus excluding the trade policy variables on the
right-hand side). In the second step, we regress the residual average informality rate on the average
national tariff. The results from these estimations are presented in columns 5-8 of Table 4. Both the
OLS (columns 5 and 6) and IV (columns 7 and 8) estimates reveal that aggregate trade protection
affects negatively and significantly the labor informality trend in the non-traded sector—i.e., the
fall in tariffs increased labor informality in this sector. In particular, the IV estimate is around
9As before, the instrumental variables in the first step (model (2))) are z1, z2 and their interactions with indicator
variables of initial size of industries.
10Sa´nchez and Butler (2004) present evidence on the exit of the least productive manufacturing firms in Argentina
during 1990-2001 as a consequence of tariff reductions.
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–0.11 and –0.13, indicating an increase in the informality rate of the non-traded sector of around
1 percentage point for each 10% reduction in the national average tariff. This can happen if, for
instance, workers that are fired from manufactures because of the lower tariffs are absorbed in the
non-traded sector as informal employees. In addition, informality can increase if the non-traded
sector expands and small firms enter the market. In terms of Figure 1, the trend in labor informality
in the non-tradables sector would have been flatter in the absence of trade liberalization episodes.
3.3 Additional Supporting Evidence: Wage Adjustment
In this section, we study the role of wage adjustment to provide additional supporting evidence for
our results and for the mechanisms we posit. To explore whether sectoral tariffs affect the wage
differential between formal and informal workers in the the cross-section, we estimate a series of
models of the form:
(6) lnwijt = x
0
ijtβx + βddijt + βτ ln τjt + βdτdijt ln τjt
+ βsdτdijt ln τjtSj + βsSj + Ij + Tt + εijt,
where lnwijt is the logarithm of the hourly wage for individual i employed in industry j in t, τjt
is the tariff on industry j at t, and the vector x includes the same set of individual characteristics
as model (1). The variable dijt indicates the labor informality status of worker i in industry j at
time t, and Sj is the industry size indicator (either the share of workers in small-size firms or a
dummy for small-size industry). Here, the parameters of interest are βdτ and βsdτ , which capture
the differential impact of tariff changes on the wage of workers with varying informality status at
different industry sizes. Ij and Tt are industry and time fixed effects.
We estimate model (6) by OLS and IV using z1jt and z
2
jt to instrument sectoral tariffs, as before.
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Table 5 presents the OLS and IV estimation results. Panel A reports estimates when using the
share of small-size firms as industry size variable (definition 1), while panel B reports results when
interacting industry tariffs with an indicator variable for small-size industry (definition 2). Industry
11We also explore instrumental variable models where the informality dijt is instrumented as well. Informality can
be endogenous if a low formal wage, for instance, creates a preference for informal employment or if unobserved factors
such as labor perspectives or job attributes are present. The results appear in Appendix A. In addition, we replicate
the procedure proposed by Paz (2014). Paz estimates a switching regression model where informal and formal wages
are modeled separately as a function of tariffs and the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the estimation of a model for
the probability of informal employment. We apply the same methodology and obtain the same conclusion we report
in this sub-section. These results are reported in Appendix B.
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tariffs have no effects on the within-industry wage differential between informal and formal workers
at the usual significance levels, regardless the estimation method and regardless the inclusion of
heterogenous effects by industry size. This finding is consistent with labor informality being the
within-industry mechanism of adjustment when labor cannot reallocate across sectors.
To study the general equilibrium adjustment, we use the identification strategy based on the
time-series variability of tariff data presented before. In a first stage, we estimate a wage regression
including the interaction between dijt and time effects Tt as additional control variables. The coef-
ficients associated with these interaction terms, bβdt, capture the residual wage differential between
informal and formal workers in each time period. We estimate this first stage separately for the
manufacturing sector (controlling for the sectoral structure of tariffs) and for the non-tradable sec-
tor. In the second stage, we use the time dimension of the data and propose a model for the wage
differential between informal and formal workers in each time period in both sectors (estimated
from the first stage) on the average national tariff. The reason to group the estimated effects from
both sectors is that in general equilibrium we expect the wage adjustment to occur for the whole
economy, since workers can move across sectors. We estimate models of the form:
(7) βˆdt = x
0
tαx + ατ ln τt + νt,
where vector x includes the ratio of the labor force in the manufacturing to non-tradable sectors,
the ratio of formal and informal labor force in the whole economy and their educational level. We
obtain the coefficients through weighted least squares, using the inverse of the estimates of the
variance of the effects from the first stage as weights.
Table 6 presents our OLS and IV results, where we instrument for the sectoral structure of
protection in the first stage using z1jt and z
2
jt, and for the national tariff in the second stage using the
average of the exchange rate of major trade partners in each period, weighted by the participation
of each industry in total employment. Panel A shows the results obtained when the first stage
allows for heterogenous impact by industry size using definition 1, while panel B uses definition
2. We find that, as the average tariff goes down, the relative wage of informal to formal workers
increases over time. This result is valid for the whole economy, i.e. the interaction term between
the national average tariff and the indicator variable for the non-tradable sector is not statistically
significant. This is consistent with a general equilibrium wage adjustment whereby workers move
across sectors and industry wage premiums disappear.
15
The improvement of informal wages relative to formal wages offers a plausible explanation
of the general equilibrium reduction in the informality rate in the manufacturing sector. When
workers move across sectors, part of the unemployed labor force from the manufacturing industries
is absorbed in the same sector at a lower wage. The reduction in the cost of formal employment
results in a lower informality rate. In the non-tradable sector, the improvement of informal wages
with respect to formal wages indicates that the increase in the informality rate seems due to the
entry of new firms that start small and informal.
4 Conclusions
This paper examined the link between trade liberalization and labor informality in Argentina using
a long time series spanning the 1980-2001 period. This was a period of sizeable tariff cuts and
of increasing labor informality. Following Galiani and Porto (2010), we were able to disentangle
cross-section impacts, that operate at the industry level, and time-series impacts, that operate at
a general equilibrium level. Our findings indicated, first, that trade liberalization increased labor
informality at the industry level, and that the magnitude of this effect depended on the size of
the firms in each industry. We argued that firms more exposed to tariff cuts substituted formal
workers with informal workers for tax-evasion reasons and that this effect was differentially stronger
in industries with a larger share of small size firms. This result suggests that increasing tax evasion
(in the form of hiring workers informally) worked as a strategy to smooth the negative trade shock.
Second, evidence from time-series variation of the data established that, conditional on the structure
of sectoral protection, labor informality in the manufacturing sector decreased as the average tariff
fell, while the opposite occurred in the non-traded sector. These are general equilibrium effects
caused by the reallocation of workers, the adjustment of relative formal and informal wages, and
firm entry and exit.
Our findings using cross-sectional and time series data helped explain some of the seemingly
contradictory results in the previous literature. The empirical results also allowed us to rationalize
some of the adjustments observed in countries following trade liberalization episodes. Moreover,
we validated empirically the intuition that the tax evasion-formality channel is a relevant firm
adjustment mechanism that allows some smoothing of the effect of the reforms. This additional
adjustment mechanism operates in the sectors exposed to the trade reform, but also in the non-
exposed sectors, and it constitutes a transmission mechanism for general equilibrium effects in
16
developing countries beyond those documented for developed countries (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2014).
This may be one of the reasons why governments in developing countries seem reluctant to increase
their enforcement efforts, at least during episodes of reform. While workers suffer in the form of
lower quality jobs, this additional margin helps maintain overall employment levels, and this is
the trade-off faced by economic policy makers. However, by distinguishing between the within-
industry adjustment and the general equilibrium effects, our results also indicated that there is an
additional dimension for this trade-off. In Argentina’s specific case, in general equilibrium labor
informality fell in the tradable sector as a consequence of trade liberalization, but it increased in
the non-tradable sector.
While greater labor mobility across sectors is usually seen as desirable, we provided an example
of one more dimension where it would help economies and labor markets adjust to a new equilibrium
with lower costs. In our case, it would allow for a smoother transition to the long-run equilibrium,
avoiding the increase in labor informality and the emergence of unemployment. Moreover, a wider
social protection net not linked to employment (as is the case with most of Latin America’s social
insurance systems) would mitigate the high costs for those workers that lose their social insurance
benefits in the process of adjustment, and would reduce the incentive to evade taxes and hire
workers informally.
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Table 1
Tariffs and Informality
Year Obs Tariffs Informality
Avg. Std. National Manufactures Non-
dev. Total Small Large Traded
industries industries
1980 1,041 40.95 10.17 20.28 15.62 32.89 10.75 22.94
1985 1,048 31.55 6.37 23.19 17.80 33.76 12.61 25.54
1986 1,146 29.98 6.98 24.78 19.55 34.72 14.95 27.39
1987 2,346 29.39 7.55 26.93 21.12 41.80 14.61 29.71
1988 2,431 29.42 7.54 28.94 23.02 44.51 16.44 31.70
1989 2,459 31.65 8.03 29.30 24.51 43.92 18.37 31.32
1990 1,467 20.56 4.64 27.88 24.99 49.63 18.09 28.96
1991 1,583 15.33 5.51 33.05 29.63 55.09 21.49 34.35
1992 1,629 17.43 4.95 32.99 25.63 46.92 18.57 36.04
1993 1,634 21.34 6.27 33.74 26.81 48.36 19.99 36.51
1994 1,477 20.29 5.73 32.18 26.18 47.44 20.14 34.29
1995 1,345 18.52 3.91 34.42 26.86 47.04 21.71 36.65
1996 1,281 19.21 3.73 36.51 31.32 50.73 24.77 38.07
1997 1,379 19.23 3.98 38.26 30.94 55.85 23.35 40.43
1998 1,359 18.8 4.00 37.84 34.10 57.59 26.91 38.88
1999 1,230 18.6 3.96 38.65 34.49 56.33 27.85 39.68
2000 1,184 18.73 3.46 39.34 33.03 57.84 26.50 40.75
2001 1,085 25.51 5.28 39.07 34.01 54.68 29.20 40.34
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
Notes: Number of observations correspond to wage employees in the manufacturing sector. Average tariff
weighted by the employment level in each industry. The informality rate does not include the public sector,
agricultural and mining sectors. To split industries into small and large, we use information from the EPH
about the size of the firm where each worker is employed. This information is categorical in the survey,
the categories being 1=1 employee, 2=2 to 5, 3=5 to 15; 4=16 to 25; 5=26 to 50; 6=51 to 100; 7=101 to
500; 8=501 or more. We classify a firm as small when the size is 15 workers or less. We then define an
industry as small when the share of workers employed in small firms is 0.5 or larger.
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Table 2
Industry tariffs and Informality
Interaction with share of small size-firms at the industry level in 1980
OLS and IV estimation
Dep. var.: Informality status of workers (1) (2) (3) (4)
A) OLS
Log of tariffs 0.011 0.044 0.043 0.049
[0.015] [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.019]**
Log of tariffs*S -0.143 -0.144 -0.165
[0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.040]***
Observations 26795 26795 26795 26795
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
B) IV - Second-Stage Results: Informality
Log of tariffs -0.178 0.087 0.091 0.1
[0.208] [0.083] [0.083] [0.084]
Log of tariffs*S -0.202 -0.2 -0.257
[0.054]*** [0.055]*** [0.065]***
Observations 26795 26795 26795 26795
C) First-Stage Results: Tariffs
Log of tariffs
z1 -0.037 -0.168 -0.168 -0.158
[0.066] [0.080]** [0.080]** [0.081]*
z1*S 0.06 0.06 0.061
[0.020]*** [0.020]*** [0.022]***
z2 -0.147 -0.198 -0.198 -0.201
[0.112] [0.107]* [0.107]* [0.111]*
z2*S 0.31 0.31 0.315
[0.220] [0.220] [0.221]
R2 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74
Log of tariffs*S
z1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.045
[0.024]** [0.024]** [0.024]*
z1*S -0.076 -0.076 -0.073
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]***
z2 0.024 0.022 0.018
[0.031] [0.031] [0.031]
z2*S -0.145 -0.147 -0.145
[0.080]* [0.080]* [0.082]*
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F 1.09 2.38 2.38 2.08
Anderson-Rubin Wald F test (p-value) 0.0358 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000
Notes: Cross-section panel regressions of sectoral informality on industry tariffs. Industry
size S is defined based on the share of small firms in each industry in 1980. In panels B
and C, z1 is the instrument defined using tariffs in 1980; z2 is the instrument based on
exchange rates of main partners. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry-year level
in brackets. The Stock-Yogo critical values for a 5% and 10% maximal IV relative bias are
19.93 and 11.59 in column (1) and 11.04 and 7.56 in columns (2) to (4) respectively.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 3
Industry tariffs and Informality
Interaction with indicator variable of small size industry in 1980
OLS and IV estimation
Dep. var.: Informality status of workers (1) (2) (3) (4)
A) OLS
Log of tariffs 0.011 0.02 0.02 0.023
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Log of tariffs*S -0.038 -0.039 -0.045
[0.018]** [0.018]** [0.019]**
Observations 26795 26795 26795 26795
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
B) IV - Second-Stage Results: Informality
Log of tariffs -0.178 -0.021 -0.019 -0.02
[0.208] [0.065] [0.064] [0.067]
Log of tariffs*S -0.086 -0.086 -0.105
[0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.037]***
Observations 26795 26795 26795 26795
C) First-Stage Results: Tariffs
Log of tariffs
z1 -0.037 -0.141 -0.142 -0.13
[0.066] [0.068]** [0.068]** [0.072]*
z1*S 0.035 0.035 0.036
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.011]***
z2 -0.147 -0.225 -0.226 -0.229
[0.112] [0.108]** [0.108]** [0.112]**
z2*S 0.255 0.255 0.255
[0.084]*** [0.084]*** [0.084]***
R2 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75
Log of tariffs*S
z1 -0.059 -0.061 -0.028
[0.035]* [0.035]* [0.034]
z1*S -0.082 -0.081 -0.078
[0.006]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]***
z2 -0.023 -0.028 -0.043
[0.064] [0.064] [0.068]
z2*S 0.051 0.047 0.05
[0.066] [0.066] [0.064]
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Kleibergen-Papp Wald F 1.09 4.52 4.52 4.02
Anderson-Rubin Wald F test (p-value) 0.0358 0.0136 0.0133 0.0056
Notes: Cross-section panel regressions of sectoral informality on industry tariffs. Industry
size S is a dummy variable indicating small industries in 1980. In panels B and C, z1 is
the instrument defined using tariffs in 1980; z2 is the instrument based on exchange rates of
main partners. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry-year level in brackets. The
Stock-Yogo critical values for a 5% and 10% maximal IV relative bias are 19.93 and 11.59
in column (1) and 11.04 and 7.56 in columns (2) to (4) respectively.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 5
Industry Tariffs and Wage Differentials
Formal and Informal Workers
OLS and IV estimation
Dep. var.: logarithm of OLS IV
workers’ hourly wages (1) (2) (3) (4)
A) Definition 1: Share of small-size firms in industry
=1 if informal -0.153 -0.112 -0.082 -0.129
[0.095] [0.097] [0.183] [0.193]
Log of tariffs 0.034 0.037 0.065 0.02
[0.022] [0.022]* [0.069] [0.063]
=1 if informal*Log of tariffs -0.005 -0.025 -0.368 -0.24
[0.029] [0.033] [0.216]* [0.182]
=1 if informal*Log of tariffs*S 0.015 0.01
[0.018] [0.023]
Observations 20661 20661 20661 20661
R2 0.38 0.38
B) Definition 2: Indicator of small size industry
=1 if informal -0.153 -0.122 -0.082 -0.204
[0.095] [0.094] [0.183] [0.222]
Log of tariffs 0.034 0.036 0.065 0.017
[0.022] [0.022]* [0.069] [0.065]
=1 if informal*Log of tariffs -0.005 -0.021 -0.368 -0.239
[0.029] [0.030] [0.216]* [0.193]
=1 if informal*Log of tariffs*S 0.009 0.01
[0.009] [0.011]
Observations 20661 20661 20661 20661
R2 0.38 0.38
Notes: Cross-section panel regressions of formal-informal wage differential and industry tariffs. Industry
size S defined based on the share of small firms in each industry in 1980 (panel A) and as a dummy
indicating small industries in 1980 (panel B). Robust standard errors clustered at the industry-year level
in brackets.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Table 6
Average Tariffs and Wage Differentials
Formal and Informal Workers
OLS and IV estimators
Dep. var.: Residual OLS IV
wage differential (1) (2) (3) (4)
A) Definition 1: Share of small-size firms in industry
Log of average tariff -0.116 -0.117 -0.274 -0.358
[0.058]* [0.068]* [0.140]* [0.178]*
Log of average tariff * NT -0.121 -0.108 -0.258 -0.202
[0.105] [0.112] [0.195] [0.216]
Observaciones 64 64 64 64
R2 0.45 0.46
First stage result:
Log of average tariff
Average z2 -0.633 -0.505
[0.190]*** [0.174]***
Average z2 * NT 0.006 -0.044
[0.214] [0.198]
R2 0.34 0.49
Log of average tariff * NT
Average z2 -0.059 0.049
[0.156] [0.143]
Average z2 * NT -0.533 -0.579
[0.176]*** [0.162]***
R2 0.98 0.99
B) Definition 2: Indicator of small size industry
Log of average tariff -0.116 -0.117 -0.275 -0.358
[0.058]* [0.068]* [0.139]* [0.177]*
Log of average tariff * NT -0.121 -0.107 -0.256 -0.201
[0.105] [0.111] [0.195] [0.216]
Observaciones 64 64 64 64
R2 0.45 0.46
First stage result:
Log of average tariff
Average z2 -0.633 -0.505
[0.190]*** [0.174]***
Average z2 * NT 0.006 -0.044
[0.214] [0.198]
R2 0.34 0.49
Log of average tariff * NT
Average z2 -0.058 0.048
[0.156] [0.143]
Average z2 * NT -0.533 -0.579
[0.176]*** [0.162]***
R2 0.98 0.99
Log relative supply Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log relative supply of informal workers No Yes No Yes
Log relative supply of skilled workers No Yes No Yes
Notes: Times series regressions of formal-informal residual wage differential on the national average tariff.
Robust standard errors clustered by year and sector level in brackets. Average z2 is the average of the
instrument based on exchange rates of main partners weighted by the participation of each industry in
total employment.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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Figure 1
Tariff Reforms and Informality
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Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
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Figure 2
Changes in Tariffs and in the Informality Rate
Cross-Section
A) All Manufacturing
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Regression details: Y=.67--.12(.078)X
R2= .008
B) Small Size Industries
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C) Large Industries
-2
0
-1
0
0
10
20
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 in
du
st
ry
 in
fo
rm
al
ity
 ra
te
La
rg
e 
in
du
st
rie
s
-20 -10 0 10 20
Change in industry tariff
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Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010). To split industries into
small and large, we use information from the EPH about the size of the firm where each worker is
employed. This information is categorical in the survey, the categories being 1=1 employee, 2=2
to 5, 3=5 to 15; 4=16 to 25; 5=26 to 50; 6=51 to 100; 7=101 to 500; 8=501 or more. We classify
a firm as small when the size is 15 workers or less. We then define an industry as small when the
share of workers employed in small firms is 0.5 or larger. In our econometric analysis we perform
robustness tests on this size threshold.
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Figure 3
National Average Tariff and Informality in Manufacturing and Non-Traded Sectors
Time-Series
A) Manufacturing Sector
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B) Non-Traded Sectors
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Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
Note: Survey effects from the estimation of a linear model for the infor-
mality status on individual characteristics, industry tariffs and industry
and year indicators.
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Figure 4
Changes in Tariff Protection
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Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010). Note: 1 Manufacture of food
products, 2 Manufacture of beverages, 3 Manufacture of tobacco products, 4 Manufacture of textiles,
5 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear, 6 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture
of luggage, handbags, and saddlery and harness, 7 Manufacture of footwear, 8 Manufacture of wood
and of products of wood and cork, except furniture, 9 Manufacture of furniture, 10 Manufacture of
paper and paper products, 11 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media, 12 Man-
ufacture of chemicals and chemical products, 13 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products
and nuclear fuel, 14 Manufacture of rubber, 15 Manufacture of plastics products, 16 Manufacture of
glass and glass products, 17 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, 18 Manufacture
of basic metals, 19 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment, 20
Manufacture of machinery and equipment, except electric, 21 Manufacture of electrical machinery
and apparatus n.e.c., 22 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, 23 Manufacture
of medical, precision and optical instruments, 24 Manufacturing industries n.e.c.
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Appendix
A. Robustness check: Instrumenting for informality status
We explore estimating model (6) by IV using z1jt and z
2
jt to instrument sectoral tariffs, and instru-
menting the informality status dijt as well. Informality can be endogenous if a low formal wage,
for instance, creates a preference for informal employment or if unobserved factors such as labor
perspectives or job attributes are present. We propose an instrumental variable that is a function
of the informality condition of other household members (Paz, 2014; Pratap and Quintin, 2006;
Olson, 2002):
(8) z3iht =

dhhead,h if i 6= household head
dother,h if i = household head.
If individual i from household h is not the household head we assign as instrument the informal-
ity condition of the household head (dhhead,h), while for household heads we assign as instrument
the average of the informality condition of other household members (dother,h). We consider un-
employed and inactive individuals that do not receive a pension as informal household members.
The validity of the instrument relies on the extension of some of the social security components to
other household members, such as the health insurance.12 The exclusion restriction requires that
the informality condition of other household members could impact on the productivity and wage
received by individual i only through the impact on the informality status.13
The first stage results for a wage regression where dijt is the explanatory variable of interest
appeared in table A1. First column shows a positive association between z3iht and dijt, indicating
that the preferences for formality or informality are shared within the household. The result is
confirmed when we control for firm’s size (second column). Second stage results for model (6) are
in table A2. Our general conclusions regarding the lack of wage adjustment in the cross-section
remain robust.
12Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2011) find that secondary workers are less likely to operate formally than primary
workers because they already enjoy some portion of the nonpecuniary benefits generated by the first worker.
13The first stage for dijt using z
3
iht as instrument captures the impact of tariffs on informal employment.
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Table A1: Informal status on the informality condition of other household members
=1 if informal =1 if informal
z3ijt 0.124 0.093
[0.010]*** [0.009]***
Firm size No Yes
Observations 20661 20661
R2 0.19 0.28
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH.
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table A2: Industry tariffs and Wage Differential
Formal and Informal Workers
IV estimation
Dep. var.: Logarithm of workers’ hourly wages (1) (2)
A) Definition 1: Share of small-size firms in industry
=1 if informal 1.245 0.038
[1.733] [1.402]
Log of tariffs -0.062 -0.035
[0.201] [0.167]
=1 if informal*Log of tariffs -0.48 -0.07
[0.582] [0.465]
=1 if informal*Log of tariffs*S -0.005
[0.151]
Observations 20661 20661
B) Definition 2: Indicator of small size industry
=1 if informal 1.245 0.341
[1.733] [1.588]
Log of tariffs -0.062 -0.024
[0.201] [0.167]
=1 if informal*Log of tariffs -0.48 -0.185
[0.582] [0.514]
=1 if informal*Log of tariffs*S 0.019
[0.079]
Observations 20661 20661
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by industry-year in brackets. Industry size S defined based on the share of
small firms in each industry in 1980 (panel A) and as a dummy indicating small industries in 1980 (panel B).
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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B. Robustness check: Switching regression model
Our result variable y (logarithm of hourly wage) is:
y =

y∗2 if y∗1 > 0
y∗3 if y∗1 ≤ 0.
The model is defined by the following three equations:
y∗1 = x
0
1β1 + ε1
y∗2 = x
0
2β2 + ε2
y∗3 = x
0
3β3 + ε3
Error terms have a jointly normal distribution with zero mean and normalized variance σ21 = 1.
The estimation method is the two-step Heckman procedure:
E[y|x, y∗1 > 0] = x
0
2β2 + σ12λ(x
0
1β1)
E[y|x, y∗1 ≤ 0] = x
0
3β3 − σ13λ(−x
0
1β1)
where λ(z) = φ(z)ϕ(z) , and φ(.) is the normal density function and ϕ(.) is the normal distribution.
The probability of informal employment was estimated in the first stage controlling for sex,
age and its squared, civil status, indicator variables for education level and household head status,
indicator variables for industry affiliation and time periods, and industry tariffs. In the second
stage we estimate two wage models, for formal and informal workers, including the inverse Mills
ratio as an additional control variable (λ(z)).
Panel 1 of table A3 shows the results obtained when we instrument for the log of tariffs in the
first and second stage and the identification relies on the non-linearity of the Mills ratio. In panel
2, the selection equation uses an additional regressor for identification (z3iht). In both panel we find
that industry tariffs have no effects on formal and informal wages.
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Table A3: Industry tariffs and Wage Differential
formal and informal workers
Switching regression model
(1) (2)
Formal Informal Formal Informal
A) Definition 1: Share of small-size firms in industry
Log of tariffs -0.164 -0.297 0.001 -0.126
[1.512] [0.981] [0.283] [0.493]
Log of tariffs*S 0.288 0.461 -0.029 -0.050
[2.262] [-3.871] [0.104] [0.213]
Observations 15,489 5,172 15,489 5,172
R2 0.68 0.58 0.68 0.58
B) Definition 2: Indicator of small size industry
Log of tariffs -0.152 -0.234 -0.100 -0.168
[0.126] [0.505] [0.162] [0.383]
Log of tariffs*S -0.963 -0.349 -0.034 -0.065
[0.885] [0.678] [0.090] [0.134]
Observations 15,489 5,172 15,489 5,172
R2 0.67 0.56 0.68 0.58
Source: Own elaboration based on EPH and Galiani and Porto (2010).
Notes: 500 bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. Industry size S defined based on the share of small firms in
each industry in 1980 (panel A) and as a dummy indicating small industries in 1980 (panel B).
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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C. Robustness checks: industry size definitions
Our previous estimates were based on a standard criteria regarding industry size categories. The
size threshold we used was 15 employees. In this section, we test whether our results are robust to
alternative size thresholds.
First, we moved the threshold defining small size firms to 25 employees (option 1). Second,
we moved it to 5 employees (option 2). We then constructed the same two industry size variable
following the previous criteria: the share of workers in firms of small size in each industry in 1980
(definition 1), and an indicator variable of small-size industry taking the value 1 when the share of
workers in small size firms in that industry in 1980 was at least 0.5 (definition 2).
Tables A4 and A5 report cross-section and general equilibrium impacts, respectively. Columns
1 and 2 in Table A4 summarize cross-section OLS results and Columns 3 and 4 present IV results.
Panel A shows the results obtained when defining industry size according to definition 1. Columns
1 and 2 shows that tariffs have a direct impact on the within-industry informality rate. The impact
is positive in industries with a sufficiently small share of small-size firms, and becomes negative
when the share of small-size firms increases. IV estimates in columns 3 and 4 show that reductions
of industry tariffs lead to an increase in the within-industry informality and the impact increases
with the share of small-size firms. Panel B presents the results when using definition 2 to construct
the industry size variable. OLS estimates (columns 1 and 2) are robust to the new size threshold
when using option 2 only (small-size firms defined as 5 employees or less). On the other hand,
IV estimates are fully robust to the two alternative size thresholds employed. Time-series results
reported in Table A5 show that we cannot identify any significant impact on the informality trend
in the manufacturing sector at the usual significance levels regardless the definition of industry size,
the estimation method and the size threshold option.
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